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Errata 
 
Page 94:  The left panel (Capelin panel) contains an error. Figure 5 should be replaced 
with the following figure: 
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Summary 
Fisheries management, freshwater or marine, is found in virtually every country in the 
world. Fisheries management is the activity of organizing and controlling the extent of hu-
man exploitation of a single fish resource or combination of fish resources. Management
can be as informal as communal social norms or as official as federally controlled depart-
ments or formal multi-national agreements.
The overriding objective in modern fisheries management is sustainable exploitation. 
Although policy-makers and stakeholders can relatively agree with this objective, the 
means to the end are highly debatable and uncertain. Therefore, normative science is not 
able to correctly describe how sustainable exploitation should take form and a new post-
normal science view is needed.
Intricate system components of biology and socio-economy as well as political issues 
are parts of modern management.  Although these system components are broad and far-
reaching, research in the realm of modern management tends to be specialized in single 
components (biological studies, economical studies or social studies) rather than through 
interdisciplinary work. Management success becomes more probable when the biological, 
economical, and sociological research is bridged through holistic system discussions and 
conclusions.
This dissertation tackles some specific topics within marine fisheries management 
through four papers: a review of management case studies, modelling stakeholder utilities 
for consensus-building, theoretical aspects of harvest control rules, and finally, mapping 
biological, economic and employment consequences of a menu of management options 
resulting from use of different marine demersal trawls.
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Definitions
Stakeholder: “A person or group likely to be affected by (or who think they will be af-
fected by) a decision – whether it is their decision to make or not.”1,2
“Stakeholder groups that have a direct or indirect "stake" can be at the household, 
community, local, regional, national, or international level.”3
Sustainability: “Development that meets the needs of the present without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”4
Normal science: “A concept originated by Thomas Samuel Kuhn and elaborated 
in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The term refers to the relatively routine work of 
scientists experimenting within a paradigm, slowly accumulating detail in accord with es-
tablished broad theory, not actually challenging or attempting to test the underlying as-
sumptions of that theory. Kuhn identified this mode of science as being a form of "puzzle-
solving." According to Kuhn, Normal science possesses a built-in mechanism that ensures 
the relaxation of the restrictions that bound research whenever the paradigm from which 
they derive ceases to function effectively. Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz eventually
developed the concept of post-normal science.”5
Post-normal science: “A concept developed by Silvio Funtowicz andJerome Ravetz,
attempting to characterize a methodology of inquiry that is appropriate for cases where 
"facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent". It is primarily 
seen in the context of the debate overglobal warmingand other similar, long-term issues 
where we possess less information than we would like.”5 Funtowicz and Ravetz believe 
that since values are embedded in science, post-normal science should integrate stake-
holders in an extended peer-community.
1 Susskind, Lawrence, Sarah McKearnan and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, eds.The Consensus Building Handbook: A Compre-
hensive Guide to Reaching Agreement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999, 1147 pp.
2 Note from the Candidate: In this dissertation, I do not define scientists and managers as being stakeholders.
3 FAO (1997): Fisheries management. FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries, 4: 82 pp. 
4 WCED. 1987. Our Common Future. The Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
5 www.wikipedia.com (accessed March 27, 2009)
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1. Building blocks of 
sustainability in marine 
fisheries management: 
Objectives, stakeholders 
and strategies 
DOROTHY J. DANKEL
Environmental sustainability and the 
sustainable use of natural resources are
goals adopted by member countries of 
the United Nations (UN 2008) as well as 
repeated in many international agree-
ments and declarations (Heino and 
Enberg 2008). An important component in 
these goals is the security and sustaina-
bility of marine resources, such as fish 
and other seafood. Natural resources 
harvested from the ocean are a significant 
source of animal protein for billions of 
people (Pauly et al. 2005; FAO 2009). In 
addition, marine resources are a large 
source of economic activity, through har-
vesting, production, and transport of sea-
food and the associated secondary activi-
ties of ship building, maintenance, and 
fishing supplies. Despite the recognized 
importance of marine resource sustaina-
bility, it is not the norm (Heino and Enberg 
2008). Only 22% of the world’s fisheries 
are considered sustainable (UN 2008).
The challenge remains how to organize 
effective practices that are able to suc-
cessfully promote fisheries sustainability.
In 1992, the United Nations agreed to 
a principle that shifts the burden of proof 
from science under uncertain conditions.
“In order to protect the environment, the precau-
tionary approach shall be widely applied by States ac-
cording to their capabilities.  Where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental de-
gradation.” (UN 1992)
The concept of the precautionary ap-
proach is used widely among developed 
nations. For example, the International 
Council of the Exploration of the Sea 
(ICES) uses a precautionary framework 
when commissioned by its Member 
States in Europe to review candidate 
management plans. In the United States,
the Magnuson Stevens Fisheries Conser-
vation and Management Act clearly states 
that the conservation of marine resources 
take precedence over exploitation 
(Anonymous 2006). But it is evident from 
the current state of fisheries that the pre-
cautionary approach in practice does not 
have an impressive record; it is simply a 
first step towards marine resource sustai-
nability and not the whole answer.
Fisheries management cannot be eva-
luated if there are no clear objectives. In-
deed, the formulation of management ob-
jectives in the absence of stakeholder di-
alogue is likely to create tension between 
managers and the user groups who are 
ultimately affected by management objec-
tives and regulations. It is plausible that 
the biggest argument against stakeholder 
involvement in fisheries management is 
that conflicting objectives make such at-
tempts futile.
Hardin (1968) coined the term “tragedy 
of the commons” to describe the dilemma 
facing, among other topics, sustainable 
renewable resources. Hardin foresaw the 
current overfishing problems and lack of 
sustainable stewardship we are faced 
with today by lack of ownership of ex-
ploited fish stocks causing little incentive
for fishers to protect fish stocks for future 
generations. Despite the simplicity of the 
concept of the “tragedy of the commons”, 
no effortless solution exists to eradicate it.
Even though fisheries management 
around the world varies widely, I believe 
there are three common building blocks 
that can form the foundation for sustaina-
ble fisheries management: (i) the recogni-
tion, identification, and organization of the 
resources primary stakeholders; (ii) set-
ting the objectives for the resource in line 
with stakeholder desires and international 
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agreements; and (iii) creating a strategy 
to implement the objectives, in com-
pliance with the precautionary approach.
1.1 The fishery system 
The first step towards sustainable ma-
rine exploitation is the recognition of all 
integral parts of the fishery system. The 
three most essential components are the 
natural ecosystem, the human system 
and the management system (Charles 
2001; ICES 2006). There are numerous
internal dynamics within each of these 
three components. Temperature change, 
ocean current changes, algal blooms, and 
resulting stochastic fish reproduction and 
recruitment are some examples of events 
that can occur in the natural system. The 
human system includes fishers, conserva-
tionists, and other stakeholders and their 
associated dynamics including employ-
ment and economic variations, interac-
tions, and conflicts. The management 
system includes the process of applying 
knowledge of the natural ecosystem and 
the human system towards actions that 
best fulfill policy objectives.
Fisheries science is inherently uncer-
tain due its vast and viscous medium, the 
ocean, which contains abundant stochas-
tic influences. Fisheries management is 
also uncertain. Human behavior in the 
form of fishing activity, and the resulting 
political issues it entails, can play a large 
role as stochastic events affecting the dy-
namics of the fishery system. Fisheries
scientists strive to understand these dy-
namics and managers endeavor to man-
age them. However, scientists are often 
confronted with large amounts of uncer-
tainty that, especially when not success-
fully communicated, can disillusion stake-
holders (Rosenberg 2007) and breed dis-
trust towards scientists and their me-
thods.
1.2 Objectives in fisheries 
management 
Successes and failures in fisheries are 
reasoned from the underlying objectives. 
A regime considered a biological success 
may also be judged an economic failure 
(Cunningham and Bostock 2005; Hilborn 
2007; Dankel et al. 2008). Objectives are 
often elicited on different levels and can 
be broad or specific, explicit or implicit. In-
ternational agreements often state broad 
objectives like “long term conservation 
and sustainable use of fisheries re-
sources” (FAO 1995) but may not be le-
gally binding. The United Nations Con-
vention of the Law of the Sea sets stan-
dards for marine conservation and protec-
tion of resources and is legally binding 
(UN 1982). More specific objectives, like 
maintaining catch stability at a specified 
level (Skagen et al. 2003), can be set for 
a fishery according to stakeholder’s de-
sires. Political objectives are often kept 
implicit. One example of an implicit objec-
tive is to have the “minimum sustainable 
whinge” (Hilborn 2007) or to curtail stake-
holder discontent as much as possible.
There are many different objectives for 
resource use (Figure 2) (Caddy and 
Mahon 1995). The resource’s stakehold-
ers can be broadly partitioned into groups 
according to their objectives. For exam-
ple, fishers usually represent stakehold-
ers who may forgo biological risks for high 
yields and profit, whereas conservation-
ists are those who are vocal toward habi-
tat preservation and biodiversity issues.
Thus a resource’s management objec-
tives should aim to strike a balance 
among different, possibly conflicting, ob-
jectives. However, a politician may not 
want to take a stance to lay down explicit 
biological, economic, and social objec-
tives. Doing so runs a high risk of unne-
cessary stakeholder conflict and discon-
tent aimed at the decision-maker. Even 
though objectives in management are im-
16
Figure 1. The fishery system including the three major sub-systems (natural ecosystem, management 
and human) and their associated major components within (from Charles 2001). 
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perative, clear objectives are not always 
the norm (I).
It is important, but not easy, to strike a 
multi-dimensional balance in fisheries ob-
jectives that can reflect the biological and 
socio-economic components related to 
the resource and its stakeholders 
(Cunningham and Bostock 2005). The 
lack of clear and explicit objectives can 
act as a barrier blocking sustainable 
management. However, setting sustaina-
ble objectives in marine fisheries does not 
necessarily mean that one must endure 
the wrath of conflict. On the contrary, con-
flict arising from stakeholder diversity can 
be put to work for sustainable manage-
ment (Follett 1955).
1.2.1 Scientists as facilitators 
The role of scientists in marine fishe-
ries management has traditionally been to 
collect and disseminate data from scientif-
ic surveys and catch reports from the fish-
ing industry to managers in the form of a 
recommended TAC (Reeves and 
Pastoors 2007). But when stocks face 
crises, the scientists’ role in the “TAC 
machine” can become less relevant
(Schwach et al. 2007); crises cannot be 
solved when TACs are routinely overshot 
(Cardinale and Sved¥ng 2008). Biologists 
become easily overworked by political 
pressure to come up with the “answer”.
In most instances, the questions asked by 
fisheries managers are beyond the boun-
daries of natural science and are better 
confronted across scientific disciplines 
(Schwach et al. 2007) in a post-normal 
scientific framework (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz 2008).
Post-normal science is the idea that 
since science-related management deals 
with deep inherent uncertainties and in-
terdisciplinary realities, normal science is 
unable to offer solutions that best benefit 
society (see Definitions). Instead, com-
plex systems are best managed by expli-
citly acknowledging uncertainties and ex-
tending traditional peer communities to 
accommodate interdisciplinary science in 
a dialogue with decision-makers and 
stakeholders (Funtowicz and Ravetz 
2008). In a post-normal world, scientists
who provide advice for management are 
better suited as society’s scientific facilita-
tors if the uncertainty and values at stake 
are acknowledged. Scientists have a re-
sponsibility to disseminate and synthesize
results from data and lessons learned 
from model application to stakeholders. 
But facilitation does not stop at dissemi-
nation. On the contrary, communicating 
science is just the beginning of a dialogue 
with the resource’s stakeholders in order
to share and communicate ideas and ob-
servations in an effort to build credibility, 
transparency, and trust. Scientists’ job is 
to advocate for the objective use of the 
best methods towards answers to stake-
holder’s questions  (ICES 2008a) as well 
as help identify a common ground when 
stakeholder conflicts stand in the way of 
sustainable fisheries (II).
In order to practice interdisciplinary 
post-normal science, fisheries scientists 
should acquaint themselves with the so-
cietal issues surrounding the resource. 
The first step to do this is to recognize 
what I call the stakeholder landscape.
1.3 Recognizing the      
stakeholder landscape 
The human sub-system in the fishery 
system (Figure 1) has traditionally been 
the system least connected to fisheries 
science and, ironically, it is the human 
system that fisheries management strives 
to sustainably control. In many cases, fi-
sheries management is a top-down bu-
reaucratic exercise with centralized con-
trol (Gray and Hatchard 2003; Prince 
2003; Daw and Gray 2005). Top-down 
control has several convenient advantag-
es (such as clear lines of control and the 
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ability to enforce tough decisions) but has
a tendency of disconnecting the human 
system in fisheries management by not 
explicitly including the human dimension
and its user groups.
The lack of stakeholder integration in 
management decisions was recognized in 
the European Union and led to a reform 
of the European Common Fisheries Poli-
cy in 2002. One of the results of this 
reform was the creation of seven Region-
al Advisory Councils (RACs) intended to 
be a forum for stakeholders to provide 
consensus advice to the European Union 
regarding fisheries management. The 
birth of the RACs was an attempt to in-
clude stakeholder voice in top-down 
management. At first, however, the EU 
was logistically unable to handle this new-
found consensus voice to the detriment of 
some of the key RACs (Gray and 
Hatchard 2003).
But it is as important for scientists to 
recognize the human system as for gov-
ernments. I define the stakeholder land-
scape as the case-specific societal con-
text of a resource found within the human 
dimension of the fishery system. By get-
ting to know the stakeholder landscape, a 
scientist is enlightened on the day to day 
socio-economic realities that stakeholders 
face as well as the political motivations 
that exist. Scientists have the advantage
of being considered an objective part of 
society by default. By nurturing and pro-
tecting this societal perception, a scientist 
has a solid foundation on which to build 
stakeholder trust, a vital component to-
wards initiating a post-normal dialogue to 
support sustainable resource manage-
ment.
1.3.1 Steps to meet the human 
system in fisheries 
Dialogue has proved to be an impor-
tant part of trust building between scien-
tists and stakeholders for different rea-
sons. First, through active dialogue,
communication of uncertainty is im-
proved; scientists are able to inform 
stakeholders of the many uncertainties 
involved with annual stock assessment 
that use scientific survey and fisheries 
dependent data. Second, stakeholders 
can communicate their experiences at 
sea from which scientists may derive im-
portant information. Dialogue between 
stakeholders and scientists is crucial in 
the development of management rules 
(FAO 1995; Charles 2001; Caddy and 
Seijo 2005; Cunningham and Bostock 
2005; ICES 2006; Anonymous 2007; 
ICES 2007; ICES 2008b; Brady and 
Waldo 2009).
Reflections on the reform of the EU
Common Fisheries Policy give promise to 
closer stakeholder collaboration in the 
realm of management strategy develop-
ment. The new scientific advisory council 
organization of the International Council 
for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is
one way the European scientific commu-
nity is striving to give advice in a post-
normal world (ICES 2008a) and there are 
examples of how ICES is starting to put 
these ideas into practice (ICES 2007; 
ICES 2008a; ICES 2008b). In recent 
management strategy development cas-
es, it is scientists, or scientific organiza-
tions like ICES, who use their status as 
an objective entity of the concerned re-
source to initiate a dialogue regarding
management issues like objectives and 
appropriate strategies (Roel and De 
Oliveira 2007).
1.4 Integration of stakeholder 
objectives in fisheries 
management 
After the stakeholder landscape is 
recognized and objectives for each inter-
est group are collaboratively discussed 
and identified, it is possible to proceed 
with the next building block of successful 
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fisheries management: integration of ob-
jectives. But stakeholder objectives often 
seem conflicting. According to American 
social anthropologist and management 
philosopher Mary Parker Follett (1868-
1933) there exists three ways to resolve 
conflict: domination, compromise, and in-
tegration. Domination is by far the most 
common method due to its familiarity and 
ease. In a compromise, some stakehold-
ers have to sacrifice some of their desires 
to achieve consensus. Integration of a 
common solution starts with each individ-
ual, or stakeholder, re-evaluating their 
desires. An integrated solution is con-
ceived if this re-evaluation produces a
reasonable homogeneity of objectives 
that consensus may arise.
“Integration involves invention, and the clever 
thing is to recognize this and not let one’s thinking stay 
within the boundaries of two alternatives which are 
mutually exclusive.”... “Compromise does not create, it 
deals with what already exists; integration creates 
something new...” (Follett 1955, pp. 33 and 34)
Since integration produces a new, col-
laborative view as a solution to a conflict, 
the conflict is settled and not likely to 
come about in the future. Compromise, 
on the other hand, is only a temporary 
give-and-take scenario that is likely to be 
faced again. Integration is therefore the 
preferred method to resolve conflict
(Follett 1955). Follett (1955) summarized
steps towards integration including unco-
vering the real conflict and taking all
stakeholder groups’ objectives and break-
ing them up in their constituent parts (II).
1.4.1 Stakeholder conflicts of 
objectives 
Hilborn (Hilborn 2007) qualitatively 
discussed conflicts of objectives in fishe-
ries noting that some objectives may not 
be as conflicting as previously thought. 
Ecosystem preservation and fishers’ profit 
are an example; in most situations, both 
objectives are fulfilled at a fishing level 
lower than that which gives maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY). In this case, 
fishers concerned about maximizing profit 
and stakeholders interested in conserving 
the resource are likely to come to a con-
sensus that total fishing levels should be 
below MSY (II).
However, there will also be stakehold-
ers concerned about other objectives, like 
yield and employment. In order to inte-
grate other components of the fishery, 
Paper II introduces a framework that ex-
plicitly focuses on dividing and weighting 
different preferences for a stakeholder 
group, thus quantifying Follett’s second 
step of integration.
1.4.2 Obstacles to an integrated 
solution 
Some practitioners in fisheries man-
agement are sure to dismiss Follett’s de-
scription of an integrated solution as wish-
ful thinking. But do not let me make the 
impression that an integrated solution is 
easy. Before the integration steps are put 
into place, it is important to identify ob-
stacles and devise strategies to avoid 
possible pitfalls. Follett (1955) outlines 
some typical obstacles that can block 
successful integration. The first one is a 
requirement of a “higher order of intelli-
gence”; recognizing the need for integra-
tion requires a superior level of con-
sciousness since domination and com-
promise are much easier and more com-
mon alternatives. Another obstacle, and 
in my opinion the most relevant, is the 
lack of training in integration and the need 
for courses in the art of cooperative think-
ing (Follett 1955). It is possible that many 
fisheries crises can be avoided if scien-
tists and managers recognize the need 
for cooperative thinking techniques and 
put them to use. Domination in fisheries 
tends to favor the strongest stakeholders 
which are usually the ones with highest 
economic interests. Cooperative thinking 
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towards an integrated solution is also a 
natural component of democracy contrary 
to domination. In a democratic society, all 
stakeholders should be represented when 
management objectives are drafted.
Top-down management has its 
strengths: when decisions are made the 
path toward implementation and uphold-
ing regulations is straightforward, espe-
cially when conflicts are real and no 
agreement can be reached. However, 
one negative consequence that usually 
transpires top-down regimes is imperson-
al orders directed from the top ranks of 
management down to the stakeholders. 
There are psychological repercussions 
that can result from the focus of orders on 
individuals or groups of individuals but
advantages can occur when orders are 
depersonalized. Follett (1955) comments 
on the observation that orders are more 
likely to be followed when they are given 
by the situation at hand and not from a 
dominating person or group. I think this 
remark is relevant to fisheries. Again, 
though, only when the integral order, or 
situation at hand, is understood by all 
stakeholder groups can orders be deper-
sonalized. This highlights the need for 
small, regional focus groups to aid in 
education (of the consequences of differ-
ent management regulations, for exam-
ple) and cooperation.
There is also some theoretical and 
empirical evidence that stakeholders are 
more likely to look for common solutions 
to conflicts of objectives when they ac-
knowledge that there is heterogeneity of 
objectives (Shelling 1960). Shelling 
(1960), writing mostly under the context of 
the Cold War, states that “uniqueness 
avoids ambiguousness.” These qualitative 
discussions on stakeholder conflicts in 
other fields are relevant to fisheries, but
There is therefore scientific motivation 
to quantify stakeholder heterogeneity (II).
But in order to include the whole stake-
holder landscape, biological and socio-
economic consideration must be able to 
be quantified (II, IV). Dankel et al. (II)
bridge a biological and a socio-economic 
model for two contrasting fisheries in the 
Barents Sea. The result is an explicit view 
of the stakeholder consensus that 
emerges. Although a quantification of 
probable stakeholder consensus cannot 
solve all fisheries crises, it is important for 
scientists, as facilitators, to present 
stakeholders with useful information to aid 
their decisions and actions (Kaplan and 
Levin 2009).
The next step towards sustainability in 
fisheries is the development of a man-
agement strategy that is robust to uncer-
tain conditions (such as environmental 
variability and fishing implementation) and 
incorporates the stakeholder landscape 
(aided by quantitative examinations of 
their preferences [II]).
1.5 Harvest Control Rules as a 
modern tool in fisheries 
management 
As far as fisheries are concerned, the 
only thing humans can really control is the 
amount and type of exploitation that oc-
curs. In modern society, management ob-
jectives should be democratically se-
lected. Then, managers have a clear 
foundation on which tactics to achieve 
these objectives can be formulated. A
harvest control rule (HCR) is a clear, 
quantitative framework that determines 
the amount of fishing pressure or allowa-
ble catch according to a given level of the 
resource. HCRs can be used on an an-
nual or multi-annual basis. Pre-agreed by 
stakeholders, HCRs are implemented by 
managers after scientists have tested the 
rule according to the precautionary ap-
proach or other constraints usually includ-
ing robustness to environmental or re-
cruitment variation. Ideally, once an HCR 
has been agreed, it stays in effect until 
the rule is up for review.
There is no “one size fits all” harvest 
rule for marine resources and each HCR 
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is rightly created on a specific case by 
case basis. There exists, however, some 
general statutes for best practices regard-
ing HCRs. Harvest rules should be de-
tailed and specific, such that there is no
“wiggle room” for stakeholders to interpret 
the HCR in different ways (ICES 2008b).
The harvest rule must be able to be de-
fined quantitatively; if it is not able to be 
explicitly coded in a mathematical model, 
for example, it is most likely vulnerable to 
interpretation and perhaps future litiga-
tion. Finally, HCRs should be developed 
in a dialogue with stakeholders. Although 
the conception of an HCR can come from 
either scientists, managers or stakehold-
ers, the end product is more likely to be 
accepted and correctly implemented by 
stakeholders if a transparent dialogue has 
taken place (ICES 2006; ICES 2007; 
ICES 2008b). Experiences show that di-
alogue and communication with stake-
holders during the development of a 
harvest rule should not be underesti-
mated. Numerous iterations among scien-
tists, managers, and stakeholders are ne-
cessary and it can take up to several 
years to get the process going (ICES
2008a).
1.5.1 HCRs in post-normal science 
Figure 3 places HCRs in the context of 
the fishery system. Harvest rules are a 
concluding step towards completing a 
management plan or strategy. The suc-
cess of a harvest rule depends on the ap-
propriateness of the overall policy (stra-
tegic management system) and ability of 
managers to implement it. Some exam-
ples of HCRs are illustrated in Figure 4.
It is the scientists’ job to test the HCR 
for performance measures dictated by 
managers and stakeholders and for com-
pliance under the precautionary approach 
which includes little risk to stock collapse 
or other negative occurrences. Scientists’ 
mission as facilitators entails exploring 
and communicating trade-offs of different 
performance measures to stakeholders. 
Consequently, scientists should have an 
understanding of the underlying characte-
ristics of HCRs in the context of different 
types of fish resources (III).
Under a normal science paradigm, 
scientists are commissioned to give 
scientific advice for a variety of questions, 
including developing harvest control rules 
for stocks that conform to the precautio-
nary approach. The HCR would deter-
mine the level of total allowable catches 
for a given year. As such, HCRs have 
been more or less understood in the 
case-specific stock for which it was de-
veloped. However, the difference be-
tween understanding how an HCR per-
forms in a stochastic model and how it 
performs in real life is broad. HCR appli-
cation in the wild is subject to a learning 
curve dictated by ecological and financial-
ly expensive trial and error experiences.
For post-normal science to work, 
scientists should use fundamental under-
standings of their discipline to guide them 
in their cross-disciplinary dialogues. In or-
der to get a better theoretical grasp on the
mechanics of HCRs, it is best to start on 
relatively simple grounds. The objective of 
Paper III is to understand important prop-
erties of a generic harvest rule.
1.6 Putting it in practice: An 
interdisciplinary aid to guide 
management regulations & 
strategies 
Harvest control rules represent the in-
nermost layer of the fishery system, but 
concrete regulations (such as gear type, 
minimum harvest size, and mesh size) 
are part of the more overlying tactical de-
cision system (Figure 3). Paper IV focus-
es on a case study from the New England
groundfishery in the United States and il-
lustrates the role scientists can play in fa-
cilitating the understanding of different 
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1.3 mill 900,000 
-30,000 t TAC*
0.25
Fishing 
Mortality +30,000 t TAC*
*Interannual variations of TAC not to 
exceed r 10% of previous year’s TAC
Biomass of cod aged 4 and older (tons)
for this year and last year [(Y-1) + Y]
Icelandic cod
Effort
Note: ICES recommends the following 
reference points: Blim 430,000; Bpa 600,000 
million individuals
300,000 500,000
Elim
North Sea sandeel (STECF rules)
Individuals (in millions)
North Sea herring
Fishing 
Mortality
-10% TAC*
+10% TAC*
Fpa=0.40
Blim Bpa
Spawning stock biomass (tons)
Source: ICES SGMAS Report 2006
*Interannual variations of TAC not to exceed 
r 10% of previous year’s TAC
Barents Sea cod
0.13
0.25
Fishing 
Mortality
Blim 800,000 
Spawning stock biomass (tons)
Interannual variations of TAC not to exceed r 15% 
of previous year’s TAC
Figure 4. Examples of harvest control rules. Fpa and Bpa represent fishing mortality and biomass, 
respectively, that corresponds to the level specified in the precautionary approach. Flim, Elim and Blim 
represent fishing mortality limit, effort limit and biomass limit, respectively, which correspond to the 
level specified in the precautionary approach as parameters of the management strategy.  
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regulations in the tactical decision sys-
tem.
In developed fisheries, there is often a 
large amount of data that are collected 
annually in regards to the target and non-
target species in the fishery as well as 
socio-economic data, mainly in the form 
of fleet composition, associated employ-
ment, and costs. Traditionally, fisheries 
science has been rooted in the realm of 
natural science and most money towards 
scientific research has been allocated to
biological studies. For larger, more indus-
trial fisheries, economic analyses are sig-
nificant to guide policy makers as well as
indicate the approximate amount of future 
investment and development of the fi-
shery. As coastal fisheries can be staples 
of the economy for some regions, socio-
economic studies help scientists under-
stand the human dimension of the fishery 
system and its significant aspects.
As an example of how fisheries 
science can move forward to facilitate 
post-normal science for resource man-
agement, Paper IV offers some practical 
insight. First, cross-disciplinary science in 
a fisheries context requires that the natu-
ral system, the human system and the 
management system be represented. We 
made use of appropriate multi-species bi-
ological data from scientific surveys con-
ducted by the scientists at the United 
States National Oceanographic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA) in a 
mixed-species model of the natural sys-
tem. Next we utilized the available data
on employment, fishing effort costs and 
revenues (landed fish prices) from NOAA 
economists to parameterize a socio-
economic model. Cross-disciplinary 
science is not about biologists posing as
economists; it requires that scientists ex-
plain and guide each other in the correct 
interpretation and use of data from an un-
familiar discipline. Likewise, our contact 
with NOAA economists here was essen-
tial in preparing the correct data from their 
databases and applying it acceptably in 
our models. Finally, we disseminate our 
results both in the short- and long-term for
four different main outputs: yield, em-
ployment, producer surplus (a proxy for 
profit), and multi-species spawning stock 
biomass (a proxy for ecosystem preserva-
tion). I feel our presentation of results cor-
rectly highlights stakeholder heterogenei-
ty and would be a helpful aid for decision-
makers to frame the dialogue on what 
gear regulation measures would be ap-
propriate for the New England groundfi-
shery.
1.6.1 Fishery system perspective 
from a policy maker 
Fisheries management in practice is 
engrained in the political system 
(Schwach et al. 2007). I wanted to test a 
politician’s reaction to Paper IV and so 
scheduled a meeting with Massachusetts 
State Senator Bruce Tarr on September 
29, 2008 at the Massachusetts State 
House in Boston. Senator Tarr welcomed 
the dialogue I initiated and praised the 
scope and relevance of Paper IV. Sena-
tor Tarr consequently offered some main 
points that sum up my synthesis of the 
building blocks of sustainability. The fol-
lowing paragraphs represent my sum-
mary of the political perspective and out-
look on research in fisheries management
he communicated to me.
First, the goal of a management strat-
egy is to manage the fish stocks as a 
source of protein-rich food that we want to 
export and make a profit on. In order to 
do this, a sense of long-term ecological 
stewardship is needed. The fishery in-
cludes a stock and a human element and 
it is of utmost importance to better under-
stand how the species interact with each 
other and with humans (including fisher-
men) so the fishery community can de-
velop a type of regulatory partnership that 
is in sync with the environment.
Second, socio-economic models 
should include the shore side fishery in-
frastructure (II, IV) since many people in 
the fishing sector are employed here and
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therefore is an important constituency for 
politicians. The Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts supported the creation of the 
University of Massachusetts School of 
Marine Science and Technology (collabo-
rators in Paper IV) to merge science with 
the fishermen and to take the fishermen’s 
knowledge seriously and collaboratively. 
Tax-payer money is used to fund biologi-
cal and socio-economic impact studies, 
so it is a relief to see that scientists are 
actually synthesizing these data sets (II,
IV).
Finally, regional policy makers need to 
encourage scientists to take on a more 
holistic, fisheries system and intrinsic in-
terdisciplinary basis for research. But this 
should also be recognized at the federal 
level in the form of appropriate financial 
support if this is to become a reality.
1.7 Conclusions 
In the previous sections, I outline three 
topics that I feel act as catalysts towards 
sustainability. These building blocks are 
general enough to be applied to all re-
newable natural resource management, 
although my focus here is marine fishe-
ries. The first building block recognizes 
the human dimension of fisheries while 
the second is concerned with integrating 
the human dimension into management 
objectives. Finally, I discuss how man-
agement strategies, based on tactics 
quantified in a harvest control rule, can 
include the interdisciplinary nature of ma-
rine fisheries and facilitate post-normal 
scientific advice.
1.7.1 Future work and outlook 
In effect, this synthesis outlines many 
of the goals of the Ecosystem Approach 
to Fisheries (EAF) (Garcia and Cochrane 
2005). Norway is an example of one of 
the many countries that have pledged to 
move forward with EAF. There has rightly 
been an impressive boom of ecosystem 
models to scientifically support EAF. Even 
though new and complex ecosystem 
models are timely and attractive (Fulton et 
al. 2004; Walters and Martell 2004), they 
are of little use towards more sustainable 
fisheries if they are not communicated 
properly and solidly integrated in the fi-
shery system. I recommend that manag-
ers do not overlook the human system
and the role of science as informers when 
setting up protocols of EAF implementa-
tion if they wish to have any success with 
the gargantuan exercise EAF implies. Fi-
nancial support should be allocated to-
wards numerous meetings of focus 
groups and facilitators from all relevant 
disciplines; experience shows that many 
iterations are needed to fulfil the require-
ments of that dialogue among all relevant 
stakeholders and the extended scientific 
community (ICES 2008a; ICES 2008b).
In this synthesis, I outline different 
ways scientists can bridge the sub-
systems of the fishery system for a wider 
base of knowledge needed for sustaina-
ble fisheries. Scientists in all disciplines 
have a responsibility to facilitate system 
comprehension toward managers and 
stakeholders. Current failures in marine 
fisheries may be attributed to managers, 
scientists, and stakeholders’ lack of ac-
knowledgement of the fishery system, re-
sulting in conflicts from working against 
the system and not with it. Indeed, Follett 
(1955) warned that a “higher order of in-
telligence” is warranted in order to 
achieve integrated solutions to conflict. 
Perhaps we have not achieved this higher 
order which has also led to the deficiency 
of scientific collaboration across discip-
lines. A reason for this is that scientists 
tend to focus on specializations and can 
use whole careers dedicated towards sin-
gle methods or concepts instead of apply-
ing their research in a broader context 
(Berkes and Folke 1998; Degnbol et al. 
2006). Degnbol (2006) describes this 
neglect as “tunnel vision” in which scien-
tists ultimately use sub-optimal methods 
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(“painting the floor with a hammer”) due to 
their lack of branching toward different 
scientific communities. Whether the 
blame for the absence of interdisciplinary 
science is lack of funding from federal 
sources or “inbreeding” of scientific com-
munities, is bait for debate. As a biologist, 
I prefer to practice interdisciplinary 
science because of the professional and 
personal rewards of cross-disciplinary in-
teraction and improved societal applica-
tion of my work. Perhaps others will be at-
tracted to the joy and challenge of sys-
tems thinking, find new relevance of their 
efforts, and follow suit.
Interdisciplinary questions deserve in-
terdisciplinary answers. Wilson (1998) 
writes about the importance of uniting the 
sciences to produce a synthesis, or consi-
lience, of human endeavors. The trend of 
exponential increase and unlimited avail-
ability of scientific data tends to breed 
tunnel vision among scientists (Degnbol 
et al. 2006) while linkages across scientif-
ic communities are ignored. Wisdom is 
not a by-product of the overwhelming 
amount of data that exist for natural re-
source management (Wilson 1998).
Likewise, the solutions to post-normal 
science questions posed in natural re-
source management cannot be offered by 
one scientific discipline or science alone.
The building blocks of sustainable marine 
fisheries are certainly dependent on the 
ability to synthesize theoretical and empir-
ical observations through interdisciplinary 
science communicated by extended 
communities of scientists.
The fishery system is the complex and 
diverse context in which scientists are 
supposed to give advice, managers are 
supposed to implement the best available 
science, and stakeholders are to abide by 
the resulting laws and regulations. Put 
simply, we are all in this together; sus-
tainable fisheries hinge on the ability of all 
system components to work successfully 
collectively. On the subject of nuclear war 
Hardin quotes J. B. Wiesner and H. F. 
York: 
“If the great powers continue to look for solutions 
in the area of science and technology only, the result 
will be to worsen the situation.” (Hardin 1968)
It is evident that societal willingness,
not technical solutions, is needed to com-
bat the depriving crises plaguing marine 
fisheries today, and is the first step to-
wards ecological sustainability (Prince 
2003). I believe it is scientists’ duty to in-
form managers and stakeholders with un-
derstandable, interdisciplinary knowledge 
in the direction of a better systems com-
prehension and international stewardship 
for sustainable fisheries.
28
Cited References 
Anonymous (2006). Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. 
Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C.
Anonymous (2007). "Resources and relations with stakeholders, Interinstitutional relations 
and dialogue with the sector, programming and evaluation." Fifth RACs 
Coordination Meeting, Brussels, 11 December 2007. European Commission, 
Directorate General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs.
Berkes, F and Folke, C, Eds. (1998). Linking Social and Ecological Systems: Management 
practices and social mechanisms for building resilience. Cambridge University 
Press,1998.
Brady, M and Waldo, S (2009). "Fixing problems in fisheries--integrating ITQs, CBM and 
MPAs in management." Marine Policy 33(2): 258-263.
Caddy, J and Mahon, R (1995). Reference points for fisheries management. FAO technical 
paper No. 347. Rome, FAO. 83 pp.
Caddy, JF and Seijo, JC (2005). "This is more difficult than we thought! The responsibility 
of scientists, managers and stakeholders to mitigate the unsustainability of marine 
fisheries." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 360: 59-75.
Cardinale, M and Svedäng, H (2008). "Mismanagement of fisheries: Policy or science?" 
Fisheries Research 93(1-2): 244-247.
Charles, AT (2001). Sustainable Fishery Systems, Blackwell Science Ltd.
Cunningham, S and Bostock, T, Eds. (2005). Successful Fisheries Management: Issues, 
Case Studies and Perspectives, Eburon Academic Publishers.
Dankel, DJ et al. (2008). "Fisheries management in practice: A review of 13 commercially-
important fish stocks " Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 18: 201-233
Daw, T and Gray, T (2005). "Fisheries science and sustainability in international policy: a 
study of failure in the European Union’s Common Fisheries Policy." Marine Policy 
29: 189-197.
Degnbol, P et al. (2006). "Painting the floor with a hammer: Technical fixes in fisheries 
management." Marine Policy 30(5): 534-543.
FAO (1995). Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Department of the United Nations.
FAO (2009). The state of world fisheries and aquaculture, 2008. Rome, FAO. 2008. 176p.
Follett, MP (1955). Dynamic Administration: the collected papers of Mary Parker Follett. 
New York, Harper & Row Publishers.
Fulton, EA et al. (2004). "Biogeochemical marine ecosystem models II: the effect of 
physiological detail on model performance." Ecological Modelling 173(4): 371-406.
Funtowicz, S and Ravetz, J (2008). Post-normal science. Encyclopedia of Earth. C. J. 
Cleveland, Washington, D.C.: Environmental Information Coalition, National 
Council for Science and the Environment.
Garcia, SM and Cochrane, KL (2005). "Ecosystem approach to fisheries: a review of 
implementation guidelines." ICES J. Mar. Sci. 62(3): 311-318.
Gray, T and Hatchard, J (2003). "The 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy’s system 
of governance – rhetoric or reality?" Marine Policy 27: 545-554.
Hardin, G (1968). "The tragedy of the commons." Science 162: 1243-1248.
29
Heino, M and Enberg, K (2008). Sustainable Use of Populations and Overexploitation. In: 
Encyclopedia of Life Sciences (ELS), John Wiley & Sons, Ltd: Chichester.
Hilborn, R (2007). "Defining success in fisheries and conflicts in objectives." Marine Policy 
31: 153-158.
Hilborn, R (2007). "Managing fisheries is managing people: what has been learned?" Fish 
and Fisheries 8(4): 285-296.
ICES (2006). Report of the Study Group on Management Strategies (SGMAS). ICES CM 
2006/ACFM:15: 157 pp.
ICES (2006). Report of the Working Group on Fishery Systems (WGFS). ICES CM 
2006/RMC:05.
ICES (2007). Report of the Study Group on Management Strategies (SGMAS). ICES 
SGMAS Report 2007. ICES CM 2007/ACFM:04.
ICES (2008a). Report of the meeting between ICES and the Regional Advisory Councils 
2008 (MIRAC 2008) as prepared by the Chair. 29-30 January 2008, Vigo, Spain, 
ICES Advisory Committee.
ICES (2008b). Report of the Study Group on Management Strategies (SGMAS). ICES CM 
2008/ACOM:24.
Kaplan, I and Levin, P, Eds. (2009). Ecosystem-based management of what? An emerging 
approach for balancing conflicting objectives in marine resource management. In: 
The Future of Fisheries Science in North America. Fish and Fisheries Series, 
Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009.
Pauly, D et al. (2005). "Global trends in world fisheries: impacts on marine ecosystems and 
food security." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological 
Sciences 360(1453): 5-12.
Prince, J (2003). "The barefoot ecologist goes fishing." Fish and Fisheries 4(4): 359-371.
Reeves, SA and Pastoors, MA (2007). "Evaluating the science behind the management 
advice for North Sea cod." ICES J. Mar. Sci.: fsl048.
Roel, BA and De Oliveira, JAA (2007). "Harvest control rules for the Western horse 
mackerel (Trachurus trachurus) stock given paucity of fishery-independent data." 
ICES J. Mar. Sci. 64(4): 661-670.
Rosenberg, AA (2007). "Fishing for certainty." Nature 449/25 October 1997.
Schwach, V et al. (2007). "Policy and knowledge in fisheries management: A policy brief." 
ICES J. Mar. Sci. 64(4): 798-803.
Shelling, T (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press.
Skagen, DW et al. (2003). Evaluation of candidate management plans, with reference to 
Northeast Arctic cod. ICES ASC.
UN (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 10 December 
1982.
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.
UN (1992). Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. 
Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, United Nations General Assembly. A/CONF.151/26 
(Vol. I).
UN (2008). High-level event on the millennium development goals. Fact Sheet GOAL 7 : 
Ensure environmental sustainability. United Nations Headquaters, New York.
Walters, C and Martell, S (2004). Fisheries Ecology and Management, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004.
Wilson, EO (1998). Consilience: The unity of knowledge, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 332 
pp.
30
